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Ferris v. State 
After Completion of a Routine Traffic Stop, Separate Reasonable Articulable 
Suspicion Is Required to Support a Continued Detention or Seizure 
I n its first opportunity to consider the issue, the Court 
of Appeals of Maryland held that an 
initially valid stop can evolve into an 
unreasonable seizure under the Fourth 
Amendment when continued 
detention is not supported by 
separate, articulable suspicion. Ferris 
v. State, 355 Md. 356, 735 A.2d 491 
(1999). Once the purpose of the initial 
stop has been fulfilled continued 
detention amounts to a "second stop" 
which must be either consensual or 
justified by reasonable, articulable 
suspicion to be valid under the Fourth 
Amendment. If elements of coercion 
are present and no articulable 
suspicion is found, then the second 
stop is unlawful. 
Maryland State Trooper 
Andrew Smith ("Trooper Smith") 
observed a Totyota Camry traveling 
on Interstate 70 in Washington 
County, Maryland, in the early 
morning hours of May 7, 1996. 
Trooper Smith, using a laser speed 
gun, clocked the vehicle going ninety-
two miles per hour in a sixty-five mile 
per hour zone. Trooper Smith stopped 
the car, approached the vehicle, and 
observed Peter Michael Ferris 
("Ferris"), the driver, and Michael 
Discher ("Discher"), the passenger, in 
the front seat. Trooper Smith asked 
Ferris for his driver's license and 
registration. At that time, Trooper 
Smith noticed that Ferris's eyes were 
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bloodshot and that Ferris appeared 
nervous. 
After Trooper Smith returned to 
his patrol car to request a driver's 
license check and write out a citation, 
he noticed Ferris and Discher moving 
around and looking back towards him 
three or four times. At that time, 
Deputy John C. Martin ("Deputy 
Martin") of the Washington County 
Sheriff s Department arrived on the 
scene and parked behind Trooper 
Smith. He approached the patrol car 
and spoke with Trooper Smith briefly, 
and also noted that Ferris and Discher 
were acting nervous. 
Trooper Smith returned to the 
Camry and handed Ferris his license 
and the citation, but he did not advise 
Ferris that he was free to leave. 
Instead, Trooper Smith '" asked 
[Ferris] ifhe would mind stepping to 
the back of his vehicle to answer a 
couple of questions. [Ferris] stated 
he didn't mind. '" Ferris accompanied 
Trooper Smith to the back of the car. 
As a result of the questioning, Trooper 
Smith searched the vehicle and found 
manJuana. 
Ferris was charged with 
possession of marijuana and 
possession in sufficient quantity to 
reasonably indicate an intent to 
distribute. Prior to trial, Ferris moved 
to suppress all evidence and 
statements relating to the seizure of the 
marijuana. At the hearing, the judge 
denied Ferris's motion, and Ferris 
was later convicted in the Circuit 
Court for Washinton County. The 
Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland affirmed his conviction in 
an unreported opinion. The Court 
of Appeals of Maryland granted 
certiorari to address two issues: (1) 
whether a person is seized within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment 
when asked to get out of his car for 
questioning upon the completion of a 
routine traffic stop, and (2) was the 
seizure justified by reasonable, 
articulable suspicion. 
The court first noted that the 
initial stop for exceeding the posted 
speed limit was justified under the 
Fourth Amendment by probable 
cause. Ferris, 355 Md. at 369, 735 
A.2d at 498. The court focused its 
analysis on the actions of the trooper 
after issuing the citation for speeding 
and returning Ferris' driver's license. 
!d. Ferris argued that the initially 
legitimate detention developed into an 
illegal stop once the purpose of the 
traffic stop was satisfied. [d. at 369-
70, 735 A.2d at 498. The court 
noted that it had not yet considered 
the issue, but two prior decisions of 
the Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland were relevant. [d. 
In Snow v. State, 84 Md. App. 
243,578 A.2d 816 (1990), the court 
of special appeals held there was no 
reasonable suspicion to justify 
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detaining a vehicle to be searched 
once the officer issued a warning to 
the driver, pursuant to a valid traffic 
stop. Id at 370-71, 735A.2dat498. 
A similar holding was reached in 
Munafo v. State, 105 Md. App. 662, 
660 A.2d 1068 (1995), where the 
court of special appeals found that 
once a citation or warning has been 
issued, which was the purpose of the 
traffic stop, the continued detention of 
the car constitutes a second stop, 
which must be justified by separate, 
reasonable suspicion. Id. at 371, 735 
A.2d at 498-99. Based on these 
cases, the court of appeals determined 
that once the initial purpose of a traffic 
stop is completed, a continued 
detention implicating the Fourth 
Amendment will be honored only if: 
(1) the driver gives consent to the 
further detention, or (2) the officer 
has, at the least, reasonable suspicion 
of criminal activity. Id. at 372, 735 
A.2d at 499 (citing United States v. 
Sandoval, 29 F.3d 537, 540 (10th 
Cir. 1994». The court concluded that 
Trooper Smith's initial detention of 
Ferris was complete when the trooper 
delivered the citation and handed back 
his license. Id. at 373, 735 A.2d at 
500. At that time, Ferris was 
technically free to leave, absent 
reasonable suspicion or consent. /d. 
The court then considered 
whether the second stop ofF erris was 
a detention in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment, or merely a "consensual 
encounter." Id. at 374,735 A.2d at 
500. The State argued that Ferris 
consented to stepping from the car, 
which did not transform the encounter 
into a seizure. Id. The court 
disagreed, noting that mere 
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questioning of an individual does not 
constitute a seizure; however, the 
court opined that if a reasonable 
person felt compelled to remain, and 
no consent was given, the officer 
violated the Fourth Amendment 
prohibition against unreasonable 
seizures. Id. at 374-75, 735 A.2d at 
500-01. 
The court applied the "totality-
of-the-circumstances" approach in 
evaluating whether Ferris was free to 
leave the scene of the traffic stop after 
Trooper Smith gave him a citation and 
his license. Id. at 376, 735 A.2d at 
501. The court noted that the issue 
was fact-specific, identifying "certain 
factors as probative of whether a 
reasonable person would have felt free 
to leave." Id. at 377, 735 A.2d at 
502. The factors cited by the court 
were: 
Id. 
the time and place of the 
encounter, the number of 
officers present and whether 
they were uniformed, whether 
the police removed the person 
to a different location or 
isolated him or her from 
others, whether the person 
was informed that he or she 
was free to leave, whether the 
police indicated that the 
person was suspected of a 
crime, whether the police 
retained the person's 
documents, and whether the 
police exhibited threatening 
behavior or physical contact 
that would suggest to a 
reasonable person that he or 
she was not free to leave. 
In finding that the stop was more 
coercive than consensual, the court 
first noted that the pre-existing, lawful 
seizure intensified the coercive nature 
of the situation. Id. at 378,735 A.2d 
at 502. The court described the 
transition between the lawful stop and 
the second, unlawful seizure as 
"seamless," so that it was unlikely that 
Ferris knew that he was free to leave 
once the traffic stop was over. Id. at 
379, 735 A.2d at 503. 
The court also considered the 
fact that Trooper Smith never 
informed Ferris that he was free to 
leave. Id. Although there is no 
constitutional requirement that a 
detainee be advised that he is free to 
leave, the court noted that an officer's 
failure to so inform the detainee is 
relevant to the determination of 
consent. Id. at 379-80,735 A.2d at 
503 (citing Ohio v. Robinette, 519 
U.S. 33 (1996». 
The court emphasized the fact 
that the trooper removed Ferris from 
his vehicle, placing him in a more 
coercive situation. Id. at 382, 735 
A.2d at 505. The court additionally 
found that the coercive nature ofthe 
stop was furthered by the presence 
of two uniformed officers. Id. at 383, 
735 A.2d at 505. Finally, the court 
noted that the environment of the 
situation, late at night on a empty 
stretch of rural highway, heightened 
the coerciveness felt by Ferris. Id. at 
383, 735 A.2d at 505-06. The court 
found that although no single factor, 
when considered on its own, was 
indicative of a coercive situation, the 
totality of the circumstances indicated 
that a reasonable person in Ferris's 
situation would not have felt free to 
leave. Id. at 384, 735 A.2d at 506. 
Therefore, the second stop was not 
consensual and constituted a seizure 
under the Fourth Amendment. Id. 
In addressing the validity of the 
second stop, the court noted that it 
must have been supported by 
reasonable, articulable suspicion. Id. 
An officer's "hunch" is insufficient; 
rather, the standard is "whether a 
reasonably prudent person in the 
officer's position would have been 
warranted in believing that Ferris was 
involved in criminal activity .... " Id. 
The court found that mere bloodshot 
eyes, nervousness, and a lack of odor 
of alcohol, the factors argued by the 
State, were insufficient to constitute 
articulable suspicion of criminal 
activity, warranting the second stop. 
Id. at 387, 735 A.2d at 507-08. 
The Court of Appeals of 
Maryland in Ferris strengthened the 
application of the Fourth Amendment 
prohibition against unreasonable 
searches and seizures in Maryland. 
The opinion, however, does not 
address the hypothetical situation of 
a police officer questioning Ferris 
under the same circumstances before 
handing him the citation and his 
license. The court states that the 
transition between a lawful traffic stop 
and an unlawful seizure can be so 
"seamless" that the detainee does not 
recognize that a "second stop" has 
been effectuated. In reality, this 
"seamless" line of demarcation may 
create difficulties for law enforcement 
officers in attempting to stay within 
such a gray area of the Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence and 
effectively do their jobs. 
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